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Abstract 
 Growing evidence has highlighted the importance of social norms in promoting 
prosocial behaviors in economic games. Specifically, individual differences in norm 
adherence—captured by the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness—has been found to 
predict fair allocations of wealth to one’s partner in the dictator game. Yet most studies have 
used neutrally-framed paradigms, where players may default to norms of equality in the 
absence of contextual cues. In this study (N = 707), we examined prosocial personality traits 
and dictator allocations under salient real-world norms of equity and need. Extending on 
previous research, we found that—in addition to politeness—the compassion aspect of 
agreeableness predicted greater allocations of wealth when they were embedded in real-world 
norms. These results represent an important step in understanding the real-world implications 
of laboratory-based research, demonstrating the importance of both normative context and 
prosocial traits. 
Keywords: dictator game; social norms; politeness; compassion; agreeableness 
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When fair is not equal: Compassion and politeness predict allocations of wealth under 
different norms of equity and need 
A major contribution from the research on experimental economics is the finding that 
humans are capable of widespread prosocial behavior despite traditional economic 
assumptions of self-interest. This is largely thought to be established through the existence of 
social norms, or standards of behavior arising from jointly-shared beliefs about how one 
ought to behave in a given situation (Elster, 1989; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Voss, 2001). 
Such norms give rise to a range of cooperative and fair behaviors, and social sanctions are 
imposed when they are violated (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 
2002). Adding to this literature, recent evidence from personality psychology has shown that 
individual differences in politeness, reflecting adherence to social norms—rather than 
compassion, reflecting emotional concern for others—is a major predictor of fair allocations 
of wealth in economic games (Zhao, Ferguson, & Smillie, 2016). 
In this paper, we further investigate these findings by moving beyond neutrally-
framed games to embedding these game decisions within normative contexts. Using two real-
world norms of distributive justice—equity and need—we examine how the related prosocial 
personality traits of compassion and politeness predict allocations of wealth when equal 
divisions are no longer fair. The results demonstrate both situational and personality 
influences on prosociality and have important implications for how economic decision-
making paradigms are applied to the real world. 
Prosocial Personality Traits and Their Differential Roles in Standard Economic Games 
 Personality psychology provides a useful framework for understanding the 
heterogeneity of behavior in economic games (Ferguson, Heckman, & Corr, 2011; Zhao & 
Smillie, 2015). Agreeableness is a broad personality trait characterized by the tendency to be 
kind-hearted, altruistic, and sympathetic (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997), which is associated 
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with helping behaviors in experimental studies (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007) 
and real-world prosocial activities (e.g., Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005). In 
keeping with this, agreeableness also promotes prosociality in a variety of economic 
decision-making paradigms (Zhao & Smillie, 2015). One example is the dictator game, a 
widely-used measure of social preferences, in which one player divides a fixed amount of 
money with a partner who must accept this distribution unconditionally (Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Contrary to traditional 
economic assumptions of self-interest, over a hundred studies of the dictator game have 
shown that a substantial portion of players allocates a positive amount to their partner, with 
an average share of 28% (Engel, 2011). These findings have been interpreted as evidence for 
prosociality, preferences for fairness, and pure altruism (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). 
 Like other broad domains of the Big Five model, agreeableness subsumes more 
finely-grained personality traits at the intermediate (or aspect) and lower (or facet) level of 
the trait hierarchy (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), which capture different tendencies 
and motivations for prosociality. While there is little consensus regarding the number and 
nature of facets, which are intuitively and somewhat arbitrarily derived, recent developments 
in personality research provide empirical support for dual aspects immediately below the 
level of each Big Five trait (DeYoung, 2015; cf. Soto & John, 2016). Specifically, Big Five 
agreeableness can be divided into two aspects: compassion, the tendency to be emotionally 
concerned about others, and politeness, the tendency to respect the needs and desires of 
others, which is closely linked to norm compliance (DeYoung, 2015; DeYoung et al., 2007). 
These two aspects are each linked to distinct political ideologies and moral values. While the 
former is associated with liberalism and moral foundations of harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity, the latter is associated with political conservatism and moral foundations 
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of authority/respect (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010; Osborne, Wootton, & Sibley, 
2013). The two aspects also map closely onto two established motivations for cooperation; 
one driven by fairness and based around moral principles of helping, the other driven by 
compassion and empathic concern (e.g., Singer & Steinbeis, 2009; Wilhelm & Bekkers, 
2010). 
 Recent research has investigated the divergent validity between the two aspects of 
agreeableness within the standard dictator game. Across four studies using both incentivized 
and hypothetical games, Zhao et al. (2016) showed that only politeness was uniquely 
associated with greater allocations. At first, this may seem surprising and counterintuitive 
given the evidence linking compassion and empathic concern to lab and real-world prosocial 
behaviors (Batson, 1991; Bekkers, 2006; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). On the other hand, the 
findings suggest that the standard dictator game measures adherence to fairness norms rather 
than altruism per se. This supports a growing literature proposing that prosocial behavior in 
the dictator game—and economic games more generally—reflect norm adherence and 
etiquette (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Ferguson & Flynn, 2013; 
Guala & Mittone, 2010; Kimbrough & Vostroknutov, 2015). 
 On the other hand, the standard dictator game, like many other economic decision-
making paradigms, is a neutral and artificial task and lacks the many contextual cues that 
influence real-life distributive preferences. Specifically, Eckel and Grossman (1996) have 
argued that altruistic processes are context-dependent and are unlikely to be elicited in the 
neutrally-framed dictator game, in which there is no reason for division of the money nor any 
basis to judge the deservingness of each player. Without any information that would normally 
inform a division of resources, players may default to equality norms around the sharing of 
money—with those who are most polite making the fairest allocations. Indeed, Camerer and 
Thaler (1995) noted that participants in the dictator game are essentially “handed $10 in 
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manna from experimental heaven”, arguing that “etiquette may require you to share a 
windfall with a friend, but it certainly does not require you to give up some of your hard-
earned year-end bonus to a stranger” (p. 216). More generally, the absence of context in the 
dictator game has been considered a major limitation of this paradigm, which compromises 
its ecological validity (Guala & Mittone, 2010; Levitt & List, 2007). In order to draw clearer 
conclusions, it is important to understand how individuals allocate wealth with respect to 
distributive justice in the real world. 
Equity and Need: Two Real-World Norms of Distributive Justice 
 Equity and need are two norms of distributive justice that govern many instances of 
real-world giving (Deutsch, 1975; Konow, 2010). Equity refers to the principle that rewards 
should be distributed according to contributions, including effort, ability, and productivity 
(Adams, 1965; Konow, 2003; Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001). Such norms 
play a central role in the division of income within the workplace, awarding of prizes, and 
fair-trade initiatives (Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2013). In contrast, 
allocations based on need underlie charitable donations and international aid (Konow, 2010) 
and reflect a phylogenetically old basis of altruism (Jaeggi, Burkart, & van Schaik, 2010). 
Both are distinct from the equality norm or strict egalitarianism, one of the simplest notions 
of distributive justice in which wealth is divided evenly across all individuals regardless of 
disparities in need or input (Konow, 2003). 
 Studies examining the impact of equity norms on dictator allocations typically involve 
a production phase before joint earnings are divided, and have revealed qualitatively different 
behavior to standard dictator paradigms (Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002; Feng et al., 
2013; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Kurki, 2004; Mittone & Ploner, 2012; Ruffle, 1998). For 
example, when participants earned all the money in the pie by completing a quiz, 70–79% 
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chose to keep the entire amount in an ensuing dictator game, compared with 15–19% in the 
baseline treatment (Cherry et al., 2002). 
 Other studies have examined the impact of need on dictator allocations. Eckel and 
Grossman (1996) found that dictator allocations tripled when the recipient was a charity 
compared to an anonymous partner. Similarly, Aguiar, Fernando, and Branas-Garza (2008) 
found that the majority of participants gave away their entire endowment in dictator games 
where recipients were citizens of a developing country who would be using the money to buy 
medicine. Recently, Klimecki, Mayer, Jusyte, Scheeff and Schönenberg (2016) reported that 
individuals gave over 70% of their endowment in a dictator game following an empathy 
induction for a person in need (e.g., children in an orphanage). 
 However, even amid strong norms there is heterogeneity in what is considered fair. In 
previous studies, some participants chose their allocations based on deservingness or “just 
deserts” (i.e., equity), while others made an equal split despite asymmetries in production 
(i.e., equality), or continued to take all the money (i.e., self-interest; Cappelen, Hole, 
Sørensen, & Tongodden, 2007; Cappelen et al., 2013; Frohlich et al., 2004). Although 
situational context in the form of equity and need norms are prominent drivers of behavior, 
considerable inter-individual variation in these games may also reflect personality 
differences. 
The Current Study 
 The current study aimed to examine how distinct prosocial personality traits of 
politeness and compassion predict allocations of wealth in dictator games under strong real-
world norms. We examined four variants of the dictator game in which we manipulated the 
normative context according to equity and need, both in favor of and against dictators. This 
allowed us to examine dictator decisions in situations where asymmetric distributions of 
wealth were normative and at odds with the equality norm. We were particularly interested in 
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whether previous findings concerning the unique role of politeness (Zhao et al., 2016) would 
be replicated for dictator decisions when these were nested within equity and need norms. 
Furthermore, given that altruistic motivations can be elicited by empathy for those in need 
(Batson, 2010; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981), we hypothesized that 
individual differences in compassion would be related to dictator allocations when norms are 
framed around need. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Our target sample size of at least 175 participants per condition was selected to 
provide 80% power to identify within-condition effect sizes of r = .21 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009), in line with previous findings for the role of agreeableness in 
dictator games (Zhao et al., 2016). The final total sample consisted of 707 North American 
participants (aged 18–84 years, Mage = 30.72, SD = 9.83; 58% female) recruited from the 
online crowdsourcing service Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.MTurk.com). To 
avoid recruiting workers experienced with well-known economic game paradigms, only 
workers with fewer than 50 Human Intelligence Tasks completed were selected. Sixteen 
participants (2.2%) had been excluded from this sample for failing two attention checks, 
which are described below. 
Materials 
Personality measure. Participants completed the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; 
DeYoung et al., 2007), which measures the five broad domains of personality (neuroticism, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness/intellect) and their aspects. We 
were specifically interested in the dual aspects of agreeableness: politeness (the tendency to 
be respectful or considerate of others) and compassion (the tendency to be emotionally 
concerned about others). Each aspect consists of 10 items with responses recorded on a 
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Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), which are together 
averaged to produce the corresponding trait score. The BFAS is well validated against other 
measures of the Big Five and has good internal consistency and test–retest reliability 
(DeYoung et al., 2007). 
Dictator games. Participants completed one of four hypothetical versions of a 
normatively-framed dictator game, in which the context of a dictator allocation was described 
to elicit a specific norm. Allocations were framed either in terms of the equity or need norm, 
with half of these in favor of the self and the other half in favor of the partner. In all cases, 
participants were asked to imagine that their partner was a stranger that they would not 
knowingly meet.  
In the equity conditions, a frame described a production phase which involved a task 
to proof-read a long paper, and for which the amount of time spent on this task was at the 
discretion of the participant and their partner. In the Equity–Partner dictator game (N = 179), 
participants read that their partner had decided to work on the task for “substantially longer” 
than themselves. In the Equity–Self dictator game (N = 176) participants read that they had 
decided to work on the task for “substantially longer” than their partner. 
In the need conditions, a frame described the same proof-reading task, with no 
information about individual contributions. In the Need–Partner dictator game (N = 177), 
participants read that their partner was poorer and needed the money “substantially more” 
than themselves. In the Need–Self dictator game (N = 175), participants read that they were 
poorer and needed the money “substantially more” than their partner. 
Next, all participants were told that $10 was provided for the completed task and that 
they had been randomly selected by the experimenter to allocate this $10 between themselves 
and their partner in $1 increments. After making their allocation, participants completed a 
questionnaire, in which there were two validity checks describing endorsement of equity 
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(“My decision was based on who put more work into the task”) and need (“My decision was 
based on who needed the money more”) norms. Participants responded to these on Likert-
type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Procedure 
Participants completed the entire study on a survey programmed using Qualtrics 
survey software and administered through the MTurk requester interface. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and subsequently indicated their allocation, 
before responding to the post-decisional questionnaire. They then completed the BFAS, 
alongside additional questionnaires not relevant to the aims of the current research. 
Embedded within these questionnaires were two attention checks (e.g., “Please select 
Strongly Agree”). 
Re-analysis of Standard Dictator Game Data 
For comparison with each of the norm-salient games, we included a similar-sized 
sample (N = 212; aged 18–57 years, Mage = 29.94, SD = 8.47; 59% female) from an existing 
MTurk dataset of a neutrally-framed standard dictator game, previously published in Zhao et 
al. (2016). In this task, participants read a description of the standard dictator game (Forsythe 
et al., 1994; Kahneman et al., 1986) and were asked how they would divide 10 points 
(corresponding with dollar amounts) with a stranger that they would not knowingly meet. All 
other data collection procedures were identical to those in the current study.  
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 We first examined participants’ responses to the two post-decisional statements 
measuring endorsement of the equity and need norms, which supported the manipulation of 
norm salience. Agreement with the equity norm (“My decision was based on who put more 
work into the task”) was significantly higher in games where equity was salient than those in 
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which need was salient (Ms = 3.55 vs. 2.33), t(705) = 13.07, p < .001. Conversely, agreement 
with the need norm (“My decision was based on who needed the money more”) was 
significantly higher in games where need was salient than those in which equity was salient 
(Ms = 2.76 vs. 1.94), t(704) = 8.78, p < .001. Agreement with these norms was not associated 
with prosocial personality traits overall (all |r|s < .08, ps > .05). 
Preliminary Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations among key variables are presented in Table 1. 
There were no significant baseline differences in age, gender, and prosocial personality traits 
across the four conditions. Mean allocations to a partner in the norm-salient dictator games 
are also presented in Figure 1, shown in comparison to data from the standard dictator game 
(M = 4.32). 
 A 2 (norm type: equity vs. need) × 2 (norm direction: self vs. partner) between-
subjects ANOVA was performed with allocations as the dependent variable. This revealed a 
main effect for norm direction, F(1,703) = 184.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, in which allocations 
were higher for games where the norm favored the partner than those where the norm favored 
the self (Ms = 5.83 vs. 4.19). There was also a main effect for norm type, F(1,703) = 8.84, p 
= .003, ηp2 = .01, in which allocations were higher for need games than for equity games (Ms 
= 5.19 vs. 4.83). There was no interaction between norm type and norm direction, F(1,703) = 
0.35, p = .86, ηp2 < .001. 
 We further compared the norm-salient allocations with those from the standard 
dictator game. Allocations in the standard dictator game were significantly lower than those 
where the norm favored the partner (Equity–Partner: t(389) = -8.25, p < .001, d = -0.84, 95% 
CI [-1.04, -0.63]; Need–Partner; t(387) = -8.85, p < .001, d = -0.90, 95% CI [-1.11, -0.69]), 
but differed very little from those where the norm favored the self (Equity–Self: t(386) = 
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1.94, p = .05, d = 0.20, 95% CI [0.004, 0.40]; Need–Self: t(385) = -0.26, p = .80, d = -0.03, 
95% CI [-0.23, 0.17]). 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations between Prosocial Traits and Dictator 
Allocations 
Variable N Mean (SD)   Correlations 
       1 2 3 
1 B5 Agreeableness 919 3.83 (0.49)  .86   
2 B5 Compassion 919 3.87 (0.59)  .88** .87  
3 B5 Politeness 919 3.79 (0.54)  .85** .50** .75 
4 Allocation in EP dictator game 179 5.64 (1.41)  .25** .22** .20** 
5 Allocation in ES dictator game 176 4.02 (1.15)  .18* .20** .11 
6 Allocation in NP dictator game 177 6.02 (2.09)  .24** .19* .23** 
7 Allocation in NS dictator game 175 4.36 (1.62)   .20** .16* .17* 
8 Allocation in standard dictator game 212 4.32 (1.72)  .23** .15* .25** 
 
Note. Cronbach’s αs are shown in the diagonal. Allocations indicate amount allocated to 
partner out of 10 points (corresponding to dollar amounts) or $10. Total N and means for 
personality data refer to combined norm-salient and standard dictator game samples. B5 = 
Big Five Model, measured using the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung et al., 2007). 
EP = Equity–Partner (dictator game where the partner has put in more work than oneself), 
ES = Equity–Self (dictator game where one has put in more work than the partner), NP = 
Need–Partner (dictator game where the partner needed the money more than oneself), NS = 
Need–Self (dictator game where one needed the money more than the partner). 
*p < .05. **p < .01.  
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Figure 1. Mean allocations by norm type and norm direction. For comparison, the mean 
allocation from a neutrally-framed standard dictator game is provided. Allocations indicate 
amount allocated to partner out of 10 points (corresponding to dollar amounts) or $10. Error 
bars indicate one standard error. 
 
Relations between Prosocial Personality Traits and Game Allocations 
Bivariate correlations between prosocial personality traits and allocations in all four 
norm-salient games plus the standard dictator game are shown in Table 1 (for corresponding 
data for all Big Five traits, see Table S1 in the online supplemental material). Age and gender 
were not significantly associated with allocations of wealth in each of the norm-salient 
games. 
To investigate the unique associations between prosocial personality traits and 
allocations, we used a structural equation modelling (SEM) framework with latent variables 
to incorporate any measurement error associated with each factor into the full model. This 
approach was considered advantageous over multiple regression, which is prone to inflated 
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false positive rates due to measurement error (Westfall & Yarkoni, 2016). We first specified 
the measurement model by defining two correlated latent variables—politeness and 
compassion—which were each indicated by ten items from the Big Five Aspect Scales 
(DeYoung et al., 2007). As the five-point Likert-type responses for these items are best 
treated as ordinal (Wirth & Edwards, 2007), confirmatory factor analysis was performed with 
categorical indicators using robust weighted least squares mean- and variance-adjusted 
estimation. We then regressed dictator allocations on these two latent variables 
simultaneously.1 Figure 2 illustrates the path diagram of the SEM and Table 2 presents the 
standardized solutions for all norm-salient games combined, as well as for each of the norm-
salient games and the neutrally-framed standard dictator game. 
We first examined the role of compassion and politeness in all norm-salient games, 
that is, where fair was not equal according to real-world norms. Here, both politeness and 
compassion emerged as significant unique predictors of allocations after controlling for one 
another. In contrast, only politeness was a significant unique predictor of allocations in the 
standard dictator game, consistent with previous findings (Zhao et al., 2016). 
We next examined whether the effects of politeness and compassion were replicated 
for each of the individual norm-salient games. Across the games, zero-order correlations with 
allocations were significant and similar in magnitude for compassion (rs = .16–.22, ps = .003 
–.03), but less so for politeness (rs = .11–.23, ps = .002 –.16). The greatest divergence 
between the two was in the Equity–Self game, where allocations were associated with 
compassion (r = .20, p = .01, 95% CI [.05, .34]) but not politeness (r = .11, p = .16, 95% CI [-
.04, .25]); however, we note that the difference in significance between the two may not in 
itself be significant (Gelman & Stern, 2006). Similarly, the SEM findings showed that 
compassion alone was a unique predictor in the Equity–Self game, over and above the effect 
of politeness. In contrast, politeness alone was a unique predictor of allocations in the 
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Equity–Partner game, over and above the effect of compassion. Neither aspect was a 
significant unique predictor of allocations in the remaining games where need was salient. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Path diagram of model predicting allocations of wealth and allowing for 
measurement error of politeness and compassion. Ovals represent latent variables, rectangles 
represent observed variables. BFAS items refer to the corresponding items from the Big Five 
Aspect Scales (DeYoung et al., 2007). A full list of these items is provided in the online 
supplemental material (see Table S2).
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Table 2 
Structural equation model (standardized solutions) predicting allocations of wealth in norm-salient and standard dictator games 
 All norm-salient conditions Standard dictator Equity–Partner Equity–Self Need–Partner Need–Self 
 Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion 
Measurement model         
BFAS 7 0.38 (0.04)  0.37 (0.07)  0.59 (0.06)  0.33 (0.08)  0.32 (0.07)  0.33 (0.07)  
BFAS 17 0.56 (0.03)  0.68 (0.04)  0.62 (0.06)  0.58 (0.06)  0.49 (0.06)  0.54 (0.06)  
BFAS 27 0.46 (0.03)  0.55 (0.05)  0.43 (0.07)  0.55 (0.06)  0.48 (0.05)  0.38 (0.07)  
BFAS 37 0.72 (0.03)  0.74 (0.04)  0.63 (0.07)  0.71 (0.06)  0.77 (0.05)  0.79 (0.05)  
BFAS 47 0.29 (0.04)  0.33 (0.07)  0.17 (0.07)  0.34 (0.06)  0.37 (0.06)  0.26 (0.07)  
BFAS 57 0.32 (0.04)  0.28 (0.07)  0.30 (0.07)  0.40 (0.06)  0.47 (0.05)  0.09 (0.07)  
BFAS 67 0.69 (0.03)  0.73 (0.04)  0.73 (0.05)  0.60 (0.06)  0.75 (0.04)  0.65 (0.06)  
BFAS 77 0.65 (0.03)  0.61 (0.05)  0.68 (0.06)  0.66 (0.05)  0.50 (0.05)  0.76 (0.05)  
BFAS 87 0.55 (0.03)  0.58 (0.05)  0.47 (0.06)  0.42 (0.07)  0.66 (0.05)  0.62 (0.06)  
BFAS 97 0.55 (0.03)  0.67 (0.05)  0.62 (0.05)  0.45 (0.07)  0.50 (0.06)  0.63 (0.06)  
BFAS 2  0.67 (0.02)  0.70 (0.04)  0.63 (0.04)  0.69 (0.04)  0.61 (0.05)  0.77 (0.04) 
BFAS 12  0.67 (0.02)  0.75 (0.03)  0.73 (0.04)  0.60 (0.04)  0.66 (0.04)  0.71 (0.04) 
BFAS 22  0.69 (0.02)  0.71 (0.04)  0.66 (0.04)  0.79 (0.03)  0.78 (0.03)  0.57 (0.05) 
BFAS 32  0.71 (0.02)  0.59 (0.04)  0.74 (0.04)  0.65 (0.04)  0.78 (0.03)  0.73 (0.04) 
BFAS 42  0.85 (0.01)  0.85 (0.03)  0.91 (0.02)  0.78 (0.03)  0.88 (0.02)  0.82 (0.03) 
BFAS 52  0.74 (0.02)  0.69 (0.04)  0.79 (0.03)  0.67 (0.04)  0.78 (0.03)  0.73 (0.04) 
BFAS 62  0.69 (0.02)  0.69 (0.04)  0.72 (0.04)  0.66 (0.04)  0.60 (0.05)  0.77 (0.04) 
BFAS 72  0.79 (0.02)  0.73 (0.04)  0.76 (0.03)  0.86 (0.02)  0.80 (0.03)  0.72 (0.04) 
BFAS 82  0.70 (0.02)  0.61 (0.04)  0.66 (0.04)  0.70 (0.05)  0.70 (0.04)  0.74 (0.04) 
BFAS 92  0.67 (0.02)  0.59 (0.05)  0.66 (0.04)  0.71 (0.04)  0.68 (0.04)  0.67 (0.05) 
Structural model         
Path 
coefficient on 
allocation 
0.11 (0.06) 0.13 (0.05)  0.30 (0.11)  -0.05 (0.10)  0.19 (0.07) 0.11 (0.07)  -0.06 (0.13)  0.25 (0.11)  0.20 (0.13)  0.07 (0.11)  0.06 (0.07)  0.13 (0.07)  
p = .04 p = .01 p = .004 p = .61 p = .01 p = .11 p = .62 p = .03 p = .12 p = .53 p = .41 p = .07 
Fit indices             
RMSEA 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 
CFI 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.91 
TLI 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.90 
WRMR 1.93 1.13 1.36 1.37 1.15 1.26 
Note. Values in parentheses indicate standard errors. BFAS = Item from the Big Five Aspect Scales (DeYoung et al., 2007). CFI = Comparative 
fit index. RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation. TLI = Tucker-Lewis index. WRMR = Weighted root mean square residual. 
COMPASSION AND POLITENESS IN NORM-SALIENT DICTATOR GAMES 16 
Discussion 
 A substantial literature has highlighted the role of social norms, good manners, and 
individual differences in politeness in promoting prosocial behavior in economic games 
(Bolton et al., 1998; Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Guala & Mittone, 2010; Kimbrough & 
Vostroknutov, 2015; Zhao et al., 2016). However, the majority of these studies has 
concentrated on neutrally-framed games where there is an absence of contextual cues that 
guide real-world distributive decisions. To address this, we tested whether previous findings 
from the standard dictator game could be replicated in the context of equity and need norms 
concerning unequal divisions of money. 
 First, we demonstrated that distributive preferences vary considerably according to the 
situational context in which the dictator game is framed. Consistent with previous research 
(Aguiar et al., 2008; Cherry et al., 2002; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Frohlich et al., 2004; 
Mittone & Ploner, 2012; Ruffle, 1998), basic modifications of recipients’ relative input in 
joint earnings or level of need changed allocations entirely. Our results illustrate the 
discrepancy between the relatively static concept of fairness in the standard dictator game, 
where equality norms may dominate the simple division of windfall money, and what is 
considered fair in wealth distribution in the real world, which is influenced by multiple 
situational norms. 
 Second, we demonstrated that distributive preferences vary not only as a function of 
situational context, but also of players’ personality. Recent research showed that the 
politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness was uniquely associated with fair allocations of 
wealth to one’s partner in the standard dictator game (Zhao et al., 2016). Extending on these 
findings and on our first hypothesis, we found that—in addition to politeness—the 
compassion aspect of agreeableness uniquely predicted allocations of wealth when they were 
embedded within real-world norms. Politeness may be important in standard dictator games 
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by promoting greater adherence to a basic equality norm, particularly in the absence of 
contextual cues. However, the role of compassion also came into prominence when salient 
real-world norms dictated unequal divisions of wealth. 
 Interestingly, the relative contributions of politeness and compassion varied across 
individual games when we examined the direction and type of norm separately. Specifically, 
compassion alone uniquely predicted greater allocations of wealth to one’s partner when one 
had put more work into earning the money (Equity–Self game). That is, when it was socially 
appropriate to demand a higher proportion of money based on input, the polite and impolite 
alike picked a similar share. On the other hand, compassion promoted greater allocations to 
one’s partner despite the fact they were less deserving. This could be understood given the 
underlying characteristic of trait compassion, which represents emotional concern for others 
and motivates a desire to help others independent of norm boundaries (DeYoung et al., 2007; 
Osborne et al., 2013). Furthermore, agreement with the need norm was negatively correlated 
with politeness (r = -.20, p = .01) in the Equity–Self game, while it was not associated with 
compassion (r = -.09, p = .25). This suggests that strong equity norms led polite individuals 
to exclude other considerations—such as need—in their decisions, while those high on 
compassion were less discriminating. 
 While our findings point to varying trait effects for compassion and politeness across 
standard and equity-salient dictator games, future research could specifically test for 
interactions between the aspects of agreeableness and both norm direction and salience. This 
would support a contextualized account of prosociality, in which different prosocial traits 
correspond to different normative cues. Rather than pitting traits and situations against one 
another, this reflects the idea that “traits are contextualized and require appropriate eliciting 
stimuli before they are manifested in behavior and experience” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 35, 
emphasis in original; see also Ferguson & Lievens, in press). Previous research has shown 
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that politeness is one quality of a good citizen, motivating participants to share windfall gains 
fairly and in accordance with basic equality norms in the neutral lab environment. However, 
compassion makes a Good Samaritan, motivating people to distribute wealth more 
generously in real-world contexts of (and perhaps despite) salient equity norms. 
 Contrary to our second hypothesis, however, compassion did not uniquely predict 
allocations of wealth when need was salient. Indeed, neither aspect of agreeableness was a 
unique predictor in the need-salient games. This is somewhat at odds with the view that 
empathy-based altruism is evoked by the suffering of others (Batson, 1991; Gilbert, 2015; 
Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; but see Klimecki et al., 2016, who found similar 
null effects for trait empathy). One possibility is that the use of a hypothetical scenario may 
not have been tangible enough to elicit greater compassion over and above politeness. For 
example, other studies with economic games have provided detailed instructions for taking 
on the perspective of a partner in order to induce state empathic concern (e.g., Batson & 
Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999). 
 Relatedly, a potential limitation of the current study is the use of hypothetical rather 
than incentivized games. It is encouraging that several studies have demonstrated comparable 
findings between hypothetical and incentivized decision-making paradigms, including those 
for trait effects in dictator games (Engel, 2011; Ferguson & Starmer, 2013; Hilbig, 
Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015). However, Zhao et al. (2016) observed that 
standard dictator game allocations had the strongest correlations with Big Five agreeableness 
and its politeness aspect when they were incentivized rather than hypothetical. Therefore, 
future research using real stakes and recipients may provide a more complete picture and 
yield larger effect sizes than those in the current study. 
 Finally, an unexpected but interesting finding is the fact that allocations in the 
neutrally-framed standard dictator game were considerably lower than those in games where 
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the norm favored a partner, but were virtually the same as those from games where the norm 
favored oneself. That is, individuals in the standard game tended to respond as if they were 
more deserving than their partner, suggesting that this paradigm is not, strictly speaking, 
“neutral”. Assumptions of deservingness may reflect just-world beliefs (Lerner, 1980) or a 
fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) concerning the source of the windfall money (Ma, 
Tunney, & Ferguson, 2014). Other studies have similarly observed that when both equity and 
need norms presented within the same dictator game, participants made trade-offs between 
them in a self-serving fashion (Cappelen et al., 2013; Frohlich et al., 2004; see also Feng et 
al., 2013). These may be forms of a self-serving bias in which individuals exploit ambiguity 
or uncertainty for self-interest, similar to the phenomenon of the moral “wiggle room” (Dana, 
Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Haisley & Weber, 2010).2  
Conclusions 
Norms of equity and need play an important role in determining distributive choices 
in the real world, but their influence has been largely neglected in studies of the dictator 
game. Extending on previous studies, we examined the role of prosocial personality traits in 
dictator games against a background of real-world norms where fairness was no longer 
synonymous with equality. Here, both compassion and politeness predicted allocations of 
wealth when they were embedded within salient norms of equity and need. These results help 
bridge our understanding of situational and personality determinants of prosocial behavior 
between the lab and the real world. While previous research has highlighted the role of 
politeness and norm adherence in neutrally-framed dictator games, our current findings also 
underscore the importance of compassion and emotional concern for others when it comes to 
wealth distribution in real-world contexts.  
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Footnotes 
 1 Goodness-of-fit indices for the SEM are provided in Table 2, which indicate adequate 
fit across the six models and appear to be largely a reflection of the corresponding 
measurement model than the structural model. Another means of addressing the fit of the 
measurement model is to account for shared variance at the item level and reduce the number 
of items by using item parcels (Bandalos & Finney, 2009). The results of the SEM with item 
parceling are presented in the online supplemental material (see Table S3) and yield a similar 
pattern of findings. There has been some controversy over the use of item parceling, which 
may conceal sources of model misspecification, especially with respect to the measurement 
model (Marsh, Lüdtke, Nagengast, Morin, & Von Davier, 2013; cf. Little, Rhemtulla, 
Gibson, & Schoemann, 2013). For this reason, as well as the fact that there was only modest 
improvement in fit, the SEM with item parceling is treated with some caution. Nevertheless, 
we also find the same results for all norm-salient games combined, the standard dictator 
game, and the Equity–Self game when analyzing the data using ordinary least squares 
multiple regression, which suggest that the current pattern of findings are relatively robust. 
 2 Of course, we would also expect such biases to vary across individuals. Interestingly, 
further regression analysis showed that compassion alone was a unique predictor of 
allocations when the norm favored oneself, β = 0.14, p = .02, even though politeness had 
been a unique predictor in the standard dictator game. The absence of a unique role of 
politeness in the former suggests that politeness is not so much elicited by the perceived 
direction of the norm, but is conditional on the salience and specific nature of dominant 
norms. One possibility is that those higher on politeness were less susceptible to the self-
serving bias in the standard dictator game, which may have led to their greater allocations of 
wealth. The current study, however, featured games with unambiguously self-serving norms, 
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and those higher on politeness may have responded to these norms appropriately, thus 
allocating no differently to others. 
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When fair is not equal: Compassion and politeness predict allocations of wealth under 
different norms of equity and need 
Online supplemental material 
Table S1 
Bivariate Correlations between Big Five Traits and Aspects and Dictator Allocations 
Variable Mean (SD)  Correlations With Dictator Allocations 
 (N = 919)  
EP 
(N = 179) 
ES 
(N = 176) 
NP 
(N = 177) 
NS 
(N = 175) 
DG 
(N = 212) 
Neuroticism 2.85 (0.65)  .03 .02 .03 .03 -.01 
  Withdrawal 2.94 (0.72)  .05 .03 .04 .07 -.003 
  Volatility 2.77 (0.72)  -.003 -.001 .01 -.02 -.02 
Agreeableness 3.83 (0.49)  .25** .18* .24** .20** .23** 
  Compassion 3.87 (0.59)  .22** .20** .19* .16* .15* 
  Politeness 3.79 (0.54)  .20** .11 .23** .17* .25** 
Conscientiousness 3.42 (0.52)  -.002 .04 -.03 -.003 .07 
  Industriousness 3.36 (0.61)  -.01 .01 -.02 -.04 .01 
  Orderliness 3.47 (0.58)  .002 .06 -.05 .04 .11 
Extraversion 3.38 (0.55)  .04 .01 -.04 .02 -.02 
  Enthusiasm 3.40 (0.63)  .10 .07 -.01 .01 .07 
  Assertiveness 3.36 (0.67)  -.03 -.04 -.06 .03 -.09 
Openness/Intellect 3.82 (0.49)  .19* .10 .02 .09 -.03 
  Openness 3.79 (0.59)  .17* .17* .06 .13 -.004 
  Intellect 3.85 (0.57)  .15* -.003 -.03 .02 -.05 
 
Note. Total N and means for personality data refer to combined norm-salient and standard 
dictator game samples. EP = Equity–Partner (dictator game where the partner has put in 
more work than oneself), ES = Equity–Self (dictator game where one has put in more work 
than the partner), NP = Need–Partner (dictator game where the partner needed the money 
more than oneself), NS = Need–Self (dictator game where one needed the money more than 
the partner). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table S2 
Politeness and Compassion Items from the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, 
& Peterson, 2007) 
Number Item 
Politeness 
  7 Respect authority 
  17 Believe that I am better than others (reversed) 
  27 Hate to seem pushy 
  37 Take advantage of others (reversed) 
  47 Avoid imposing my will on others 
  57 Rarely put people under pressure 
  67 Insult people (reversed) 
  77 Seek conflict (reversed) 
  87 Love a good fight (reversed) 
  97 Am out for my own personal gain (reversed) 
Compassion 
  2 Am not interested in other people’s problems (reversed) 
  12 Feel others’ emotions 
  22 Inquire about others’ well-being 
  32 Can't be bothered with other's needs (reversed) 
  42 Sympathize with others’ feelings 
  52 Am indifferent to the feelings of others (reversed) 
  62 Take no time for others (reversed) 
  72 Take an interest in other people’s lives 
  82 Don't have a soft side (reversed) 
  92 Like to do things for others 
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Re-analysis using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) with Item Parceling 
 Given concerns around the fit of the main SEM, we also re-analyzed the data using 
SEM with item parceling to address the fit of the measurement model by accounting for some 
of the shared variance at the item level and to reduce the number of items (Bandalos & 
Finney, 2009). For each condition, the structural equation model consisted of a confirmatory 
factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation. There were two correlated latent 
variables—politeness and compassion—which were indicated by three item parcels each. 
Based on the recommendations of Marsh, Lüdtke, Nagengast, Morin, and Von Davier (2013), 
item parcels were created using a homogeneous parceling strategy, in which closely-related 
items likely to share a source of systematic variation were placed in the same parcel. This 
was determined based on the factor loadings from an exploratory factor analysis for each 
aspect of agreeableness, using the corresponding ten items from the Big Five Aspect Scales 
(DeYoung et al., 2007). We then regressed dictator allocations on these two latent variables 
simultaneously. As there is some controversy around item parceling, which may conceal 
sources of model misspecification (Marsh et al., 2013; cf. Little, Rhemtulla, Gibson, & 
Schoemann, 2013), this analysis is treated with some caution. 
 The SEM with item parceling generally yielded a slight improvement in fit, although 
this was not consistent across all fit statistics and conditions. The pattern of findings 
replicated those of the item-level SEM (albeit with some secondary findings approaching 
significance). Notably, compassion again emerged as a unique predictor of allocations of 
wealth for all norm-salient games combined, in addition to politeness, which showed a trend 
toward significance. This was in contrast to the standard dictator game, where politeness 
alone was a unique predictor of allocations, over and above the effect of compassion.
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Table S3 
Structural equation model with item parceling (standardized solutions) predicting allocations of wealth in norm-salient and standard dictator games 
 All norm-salient conditions Standard dictator Equity–Partner Equity–Self Need–Partner Need–Self 
 Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion Politeness Compassion 
Measurement model         
Parcel 1 (27, 47, 57) 0.37 (0.04)  0.40 (0.07)  0.31 (0.09)  0.39 (0.08)  0.47 (0.08)  0.28 (0.08)  
Parcel 2 (7, 17R, 37R, 67R, 97R) 0.79 (0.03)  0.96 (0.05)  0.86 (0.08)  0.76 (0.08)  0.72 (0.06)  0.84 (0.07)  
Parcel 3 (77R, 87R) 0.58 (0.04)  0.60 (0.05)  0.52 (0.08)  0.51 (0.08)  0.62 (0.07)  0.63 (0.07)  
Parcel 4 (12, 42, 82R)  0.78 (0.02)  0.79 (0.04)  0.81 (0.04)  0.78 (0.04)  0.76 (0.04)  0.79 (0.04) 
Parcel 5 (22, 72, 92)  0.79 (0.02)  0.77 (0.04)  0.76 (0.04)  0.81 (0.04)  0.80 (0.04)  0.79 (0.04) 
Parcel 6 (2R, 32R, 52R, 62R)  0.81 (0.02)  0.78 (0.04)  0.83 (0.04)  0.79 (0.04)  0.82 (0.04)  0.79 (0.04) 
Structural model         
Path coefficient on allocation 0.12 (0.07) 0.13 (0.06) 0.29 (0.11) -0.04 (0.12) 0.20 (0.11) 0.12 (0.11) -0.01 (0.138) 0.22 (0.13) 0.27 (0.16) 0.01 (0.15) 0.12 (0.12) 0.13 (0.12) 
p = .07  p = .03 p = .01 p = .75 p = .07 p = .26 p = .944 p = .08 p = .10 p = .95 p = .34 p = .27 
Fit indices             
RMSEA 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.13 
CFI 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.91 
TLI 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.97 0.84 
SRMR 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 
 
Note. Values in parentheses indicate standard errors. CFI = Comparative fit index. RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation. TLI = Tucker-Lewis 
index. SRMR = Standardized root mean square residual.  
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